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Abstract
Standard probability theory has been extremely successful but there
are some conceptually possible scenarios, such as fair infinite lotteries,
that it does not model well. For this reason alternative probabil-
ity theories have been formulated. We look at three of these: Pop-
per functions, a specific kind of non-Archimedean probability func-
tions, and lexicographic probability functions. We relate Popper func-
tions to non-Archimedean probability functions (of a specific kind) by
means of a representation theorem: every non-Archimedean proba-
bility function is infinitesimally close to some Popper function, and
vice versa. We also show that non-Archimedean probability functions
∗We are indebted to Paul Pedersen, Stanislav Speranski, Sylvia Wenmackers, and two
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The first
author’s research was supported by an ESPRC scholarship.
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can be given a lexicographic representation. Thus Popper functions,
a specific kind of non-Archimedean probability functions, and lexico-
graphic probability functions triangulate to the same place: they are
in a good sense interchangeable.
Introduction
Popper functions were introduced in [Popper 1959]. They have been used
quantitatively to describe probabilistic concepts and situations that fall out-
side the scope of classical probability theory. In particular, Popper func-
tions have proved useful in modelling learning from evidence, indicative
and counterfactual conditionals, decision and utility theory [McGee 1994]
[Leitgeb 2012].
Popper functions are typically defined axiomatically, by a list of properties
that these functions are required to satisfy. Of course such presentations are
accompanied by demonstrations that the list of axioms is consistent.
It is immediate from the axioms of Kolmogorov that a concept of probabil-
ity is thereby defined: the Kolmogorov axioms represent intuitive properties
of an informal concept of probability. This is not so for the axioms that de-
fine Popper functions. These axioms implicitly define a conditional function
on a class of propositions. But it is not immediate from the Popper function
axioms that they define a concept of conditional probability. It is difficult to
see which models are allowed by the axioms governing Popper functions. So
one may wonder whether there are some Popper functions that really can-
not be taken to represent probability. It has been argued that the notion of
conditional probability is actually prior to its definition in terms of absolute
2
probability [Hajek 2003], and so the idea of Popper functions is a reasonable
one. But how can we tell that Popper hit upon the right set of axioms?
One principal aim of the present article is to make a case for the thesis
that Popper functions do capture a pre-theoretical concept of quantitative
probability. We do this by relating Popper functions to a class of functions
for which it is more immediate that they capture an informal concept of
quantitative probability: we will relate Popper functions to non-Archimedean
probability functions.
The idea of infinitely small numbers (infinitesimals) goes back at least
to Leibniz and Newton. It was shown to be mathematically coherent in the
middle of the last century by Abraham Robinson [Robinson 1961].
The concept of fair lotteries on infinite sample spaces motivates the ap-
plication of infinitesimals to the theory of probabilities. In particular, for
such a lottery it seems prima facie reasonable to assign a non-zero but in-
finitesimally small probability value to every proposition that states that
a given ticket is the winning one. A property that one might want to
impose on non-Archimedean probability functions in infinite lottery situa-
tions is regularity, i.e., the condition that only the impossible event receives
probability 0. In this article, we focus on one particular form that such a
non-Archimedean probability theory can take, namely the theory that was
developed in [Benci et al 2013] and [Wenmackers and Horsten 2013].1
A key difference between Popper functions and non-Archimedean proba-
1There are of course other approaches to non-Archimedean probability: see for instance
[Nelson 1987]. For a defence of the thesis that the theory that we are focussing on in this
article constitutes a good framework for developing a theory of infinitesimal probabilities,
see [Benci et al forthc.].
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bility functions is that the former take values in the real [0, 1] interval whereas
the latter take values in the [0, 1] interval of a non-Archimedean extension
of R. Yet we will show that Popper functions are closely related to non-
Archimedean probability functions. We will prove a representation theo-
rem that relates regular non-Archimedean probability functions to Popper
functions (section 3). On the one hand, for every finitely additive Popper
function, there is a regular non-Archimedean probability function that is
point-wise infinitesimally close to it. On the other hand, for every regu-
lar non-Archimedean function there is a Popper function that is point-wise
infinitesimally close to it. The latter is fairly trivial; the former is not.
One direction of the theorem shows that Popper functions cannot do any-
thing that non-Archimedean probability functions cannot do. So if one be-
lieves that non-Archimedean probability functions (as explicated in [Benci et al 2013])
model an intuitive notion of probability well, then Popper functions must too:
while they may not give us as much information, they cannot go against our
intuitions concerning concepts of probability to any greater extent than non-
Archimedean probability functions. The converse direction of the theorem
shows that that in all the applications of Popper functions to describe situa-
tions or elucidate concepts, the notion of non-Archimedean probability may
also be employed.
There are still reasons one may prefer non-Archimedean probability func-
tions over Popper functions or vice versa: for instance, a non-Archimedean
probability function will enable us to compare probabilities at a much finer
level than a Popper function, distinguishing between events whose probabil-
ities only differ by infinitesimal amounts. On the other hand, one may argue
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that this level of detail is uncalled for and not justified by our intuitions. But
neither can go too far wrong if you believe the other is correct.
Non-Archimedean probability functions are themselves not completely
intuitive. One source of mystery is the non-wellfoundedness of the degrees
of infinitesimality that such probability functions entail. This seems to open
the prospect that the probability of one event can be smaller than that of
another event even though there is no largest degree of infinitesimality at
which they differ. This would of course make such functions very hard to
picture.
In response to this, we prove a second representation theorem (section
4). This second theorem relates the non-Archimedean probability theo-
ries under consideration to lexicographical probability functions as discussed
in [Blume et al 1991] and in [Halpern 2010, sections 1.–3.]. In particular,
we show that despite the non-wellfounded structure of the range of non-
Archimedean probability functions, probability values can be ordered lexico-
graphically. This phenomenon gives us deeper insight into the structure of
non-Archimedean probability functions. Conversely, it links the applications
of lexicographic probability theory to non-Archimedean probability. In par-
ticular, it suggests ways in which non-Archimedean probability theory can be
connected to utility and decision theory by supplying hierarchical orderings
of ‘null events’.2
In sum, the representation theorems that are proved in this article are
intended so shore up the foundations of all three representations of proba-
bility. If one has concerns about any two of the three theories investigated
2The connection between utility theory and non-Archimedean probability theory for
infinite state spaces is investigated in [Pedersen forthc.].
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in this article, but not about the third, then the results of this paper offer
some reassurance. We have a virtuous triangle of representations: starting
anywhere on the triangle, one can get anywhere else.
In the proofs of our representation theorems, we will be building on and
extending results in this area that are explained and discussed in [Halpern 2010].
The construction of the non-Archimedean probability functions uses math-
ematical tools that some readers may not be familiar with —in particular
ultrafilters and ultraproduct constructions. In section 2 where we introduce
these functions we give the precise definitions but also describe the basic
properties that result, and the short proofs here give a flavour of how these
are used. The proofs of the main theorems in the paper are technical, but
only an understanding of the statements of the theorems is necessary to grasp
their philosophical import.
1 Popper functions
1.1 Axiomatic description
Popper functions were originally introduced so that conditional probabilities
could be assigned where the event conditioned on would receive absolute
probability zero. They are both a weakening and an extension of classical
probability. Countable additivity is not imposed (it can be, but then Popper
functions become less useful for modelling situations, like the infinite lotteries
alluded to earlier, which classical probability cannot model), and additional
conditional probabilities are defined. Popper functions are introduced ax-
iomatically, the suggestion being that these are the right axioms to model
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conditional probability. We follow the presentation in [Leitgeb 2012].
For some propositional language L let C : L × L → [0, 1]. C is Popper
function if it satisfies:
1. C(a, a) = 1
2. If C(¬a, a) 6= 1 then C(., a) is a probability function (i.e. satisfying the
Kolmogorov axioms with finite additivity replacing countable additiv-
ity)
3. C(a ∧ b, d) = C(a, d)× C(b, a ∧ d)
4. If C(a, b) = C(b, a) = 1 then for all d ∈ L, C(d, a) = C(d, b)
The intended interpretation of C(a, b) here is the probability of a occurring
conditional on b occurring. It is not immediately obvious that conditional
probabilities should satisfy these axioms but a little work shows they do,
at least in intuitive situations. (If we have C(¬a, a) = 1 then it can be
shown that C(., a) is the constant function 1, so that a is to be interpreted as
impossible or contradictory event). Also note that absolute probabilities can
be retrieved from a Popper function by taking the probability conditional on
a tautology.
Of course none of this would be of any significance if the axioms governing
Popper functions were inconsistent. But it can be shown that on all sample
spaces, finite and infinite, Popper functions can be defined.
1.2 Uses
Popper functions do solve some of the problems outlined above for the stan-
dard theory of probability. In particular, the main selling point of Popper
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functions is of course reclaiming the conditional probabilities that are intu-
itively justified. Also, certain situations that cannot be modelled with stan-
dard probability functions (such as a fair lottery on N), can be consistently
modelled using a Popper function [Van Fraassen 1976].
For these reasons, Popper functions have been quite useful in philosophy.
In Bayesian theories of belief revision under new evidence, a rational agent
will start with a credence function that obeys the standard laws of probability.
Then this credence is revised under new evidence E, so that the new credence
of a proposition is the old credence of that proposition conditional on E. But
in standard probability theory, if the evidence E has probability zero, such
conditionals are undefined. Should we be worried about how to rationally
react to evidence that has probability zero? Well, given that this evidence
may still be possible, we should. After all, a theory of rationality is not
primarily a practical theory: what really concerns us is what it means to
be rational, so we should take all possibilities into account [Levi 1989]. One
obvious way of doing this is to use Popper functions.3
Further uses for Popper functions include theories of indicative and coun-
terfactual conditionals. For an application of Popper functions to the the-
ory of indicative conditionals, the reader may consult [McGee 1994]; for the
use of Popper functions in the theory of counterfactual conditionals, see
[Leitgeb 2012].
However, this usefulness really depends on our being willing to accept
that Popper functions provide a good model of conditional probability. And
3For a defence of the role of Popper functions in satisfactory theories of condition-
alisation on evidence, see e.g. [Harper 1975]. For a discussion of the limitations of the
usefulness of Popper functions for such purposes, see [Pruss 2015].
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it is not clear that we should be. The problem of probabilities of infinite sets
not depending on the probabilities of their component subsets is even worse
here than in the standard picture, as we don’t even have countable additivity.
It seems that the probabilities could somehow be arbitrary, floating free of
the probabilities of point-events that make them up. And if so, this cannot
be consistent with our intuitive notion of probability. But is that really
possible? That is one of the questions this paper seeks to answer, by showing
how Popper functions are closely tied to a richer alternative theory: a theory
of non-Archimedean probability.
2 Non-Archimedean probability functions
From now on, we will focus on one particular non-Archimedean probability,
namely the theory that is calledNAP , which was developed in [Benci et al 2013].
In NAP , the unconditional probability of an event is defined in terms
of the conditional probability of an event. Loosely speaking, the probability
P (A) of event A is conceived of as the limit of P (A | λ), for the finite set λ
“tending toward infinity”: P (A) is conceived of as the limit of the relative
frequency of A’s on finite snapshots of the sample space.
In this section, we sketch how NAP functions are constructed, and what
their basic properties are.4
4For details of the proofs and constructions, see [Benci et al 2013]. The only difference
between the constructions in [Benci et al 2013] and the constructions in this article is that
in the present article, the constructions are carried out using filters instead of ideals. But
it is easily verified that the two formulations of the theory are equivalent.
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2.1 Limits
Let there be given a sample space Ω. And let Λ be a directed (under the
inclusion ordering) subset of the collection Pfin(Ω) of finite subsets of Ω
such that
⋃
Λ = Ω. For any λ ∈ Λ and for any event A (i.e., subset of
Ω), P (A | λ) ∈ R, where P (A | λ) is taken to be defined as in classical
probability theory using the ratio formula (since λ is finite):
P (A | λ) ≡
|A ∩ λ|
|λ|
.
Intuitively, Pfin(Ω) contains the finite subsets on which any given event A is
“tested”, and as the test sets move up the ordering, they “approach infinity”.
We want to conceive of the sought for probability function as a kind of limit.
We are of course interested in the case where Ω is infinite.
If Ω is infinite, we take a free ultrafilter UΛ over Λ and we set
R
∗ ≡ F (Λ,R) /UΛ, (1)
where F (Λ,R) is the class of functions from Λ to R, and F (Λ,R) /UΛ denotes
the set of equivalence classes [ϕ]UΛ with respect to the relation ≈UΛdefined
by
ϕ ≈UΛ ψ ⇔ ∃Q ∈ UΛ, ∀λ ∈ Q, ϕ(λ) = ψ(λ).
The elements of R∗ can then indeed be regarded as ‘limits’:
Definition 1 (Ω-limit)
lim
λ↑Ω
ϕ(λ) ≡ [ϕ]UΛ . (2)
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The set R∗ will serve as the range of our Non-Archimedean Probability
function. We want to identify R with a subset of R∗. Therefore we identify
the equivalence class of the function ϕc with constant value c with the real
number c. We want to calculate (add, multiply) with the elements of R∗.
Therefore we define addition and multiplication on elements of R∗ point-
wise. It can then be verified (using standard arguments from non-standard
analysis) that R∗ is a (Non-Archimedean) field.
2.2 Infinitesimal probabilities
Using this notion of Ω-limit we can now define a non-Archimedean probability
function as follows:
Definition 2
P (A) = lim
λ↑Ω
P (A | λ). (3)
The intuitive meaning of the equation P (A) = lim
λ↑Ω
P (A | λ) is that the prob-
ability of an event A is the Ω-limit of the conditional probability P (A | λ)
obtained by a finite sample set λ.
It can then be shown that P satisfies the laws for being a finitely additive
probability function (except that the value is taken not in R but in a non-
Archimedean field):
• (NAP1) Domain and range. The events are all the subsets of Ω,
which is a finite or infinite sample space. Probability is a total function
P : P (Ω)→ R∗
where R∗ is a superreal field, where a superreal field is an ordered field
which contains the real numbers as subfield.
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• (NAP2) Normalization.
P (Ω) = 1 (4)
• (NAP3) Additivity. If A and B are events and A ∩ B = ∅, then
P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B)
Since the non-Archimedean probability function that is thus defined de-
pends on the initial choice of free ultrafilter U , we should strictly speaking
write PU instead of P .
2.3 Regularity
We now look at how we can impose a general condition on the limit con-
struction to ensure the probability functions that result are regular, i.e., that
for such P :
Definition 3 (Regularity) ∀A ∈ P (Ω) \ {∅} :
P (A) > 0 (5)
We have seen that the probability functions PU that we have defined so
far are determined by ultrafilters U on Λ —which is a directed (under the
inclusion ordering) subset of the collection Pfin(Ω). The regularity of PU can
be forced to hold by imposing a condition on the ultrafilter U on which it is
based:
Definition 4 (fine ultrafilter) An ultrafilter U on Λ is fine if and only if
for every a ∈ Ω, we have:
{λ ∈ Pfin(Ω) : a ∈ λ} ∈ U .
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Then we immediately have:
Proposition 5 If U is fine, then PU is regular.
Proof. Consider any a ∈ Ω. Then PU({a}) 6= 0 if and only if
{λ ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | λ) 6= 0} ∈ U .
But {λ ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | λ) 6= 0} = {λ ∈ Pfin(Ω) : a ∈ λ}, which belongs
to U by the fineness condition.
2.4 Weights
The class of non-Archimedean probability functions that we have defined so
far are those that are determined by fine (and free) ultrafilters according
to the recipe described in the previous sections. But this class is still too
narrow, because it turns out that all those functions PU are uniform:
Proposition 6 For all fine ultrafilters U on Λ, and for all a, b ∈ Ω:
PU({a}) = PU({b}).
Proof. PU({a}) = PU({b}) if and only if
{A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | A) = P ({b} | A)} ∈ U .
But {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | A) = P ({b} | A)} =
{A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | A) ≤ P ({b} | A)} ∩ {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | A) ≥
P ({b} | A)}. Now {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | A) ≤ P ({b} | A)} =
{A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : b ∈ A} ∪ {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : a 6∈ A ∧ b 6∈ A}. By fineness
and the superset property for ultrafilters, we indeed have {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : b ∈
A} ∪ {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : a 6∈ A ∧ b 6∈ A} ∈ U , i.e., {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | A) ≤
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P ({b} | A)} ∈ U . Similarly, {A ∈ Pfin(Ω) : P ({a} | A) ≥ P ({b} | A)} ∈ U .
So their intersection must also be in U .
But we do not want to build uniformity into the definition of our non-
Archimedean probability functions. So we allow also probability functions
PU ,w that are “tempered” by a real-valued weight function w. To be more
precise, our official definition of non-Archimedean probability functions is as
follows:
Definition 7 (NAP functions) If U is a free and fine ultrafilter on a di-
rected set Λ ⊆ Pfin(Ω), and we have a weight function w : Ω 7→ R
+, and PU
is as defined in the preceding sections, then
P (A) = lim
λ↑Ω
P (A | λ)
is a non-Archimedean probability function (NAP function), where
P (A | λ) ≡
Σa∈A∩λ(w(a))
Σa∈λ(w(a))
.
This then is the class of non-Archimedean probability functions that we will
be concerned with in this article. Clearly P is then always a finitely additive
probability function, is regular (if w takes strictly positive values everywhere),
and may be but need not be uniform.
As before, we should strictly speaking write PU ,w instead of P . Often in
what follows it will be clear from the context what w and U are; in such
cases, we will omit the subscripts from PU ,w.
Our non-Archimedean probability functions P are then determined by a
triple 〈Ω,U , w〉, where
• Ω is the sample space;
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• U is a free and fine ultrafilter on some directed subset Λ of Pfin(Ω)
such that
⋃
Λ = Ω;
• w : Ω→ R+ is a weight function.
A triple 〈Ω,U , w〉 is called a NAP space.
2.5 Infinite sums
The Weierstrass notion of limit allows us to give a rigorous definition of the
sum of an infinite sequence. Analogously, the Ω-limit allows the definition of
the sum of infinitely many real numbers. In this section we will investigate
this operation.
Let xω be a family of real numbers indexed by ω ∈ E ⊆ Ω; the Ω-sum of
all xω
′s is defined as follows:
Σω∈Exω = lim
λ↑Ω
(Σω∈E∩λxω) (6)
Notice that, since λ is always finite, the function
ϕ(λ) := Σω∈E∩λxω
of λ is well defined, yielding always real number as function value.
Our new type of infinite sum of course differs in certain respects from the
usual Weierstrass-sum. First of all, the Ω-sum depends on the choice of a free
ultrafilter UΛ. This is not the case with the usual series. So it would actually
be more appropriate to write Σω∈E;UΛxω rather than Σω∈Exω. Secondly, the
Weierstrass-sum of a series exists only for certain denumerable sets of real
numbers, while the Ω-sum exists for every family of real numbers indexed by
ω ∈ E ⊆ Ω. In principle Ω and hence E may have any cardinality. Lastly,
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the Weierstrass-sum of a series —if it exists— is a real number, while the
result of a Ω-sum is a hyperreal number in R∗.
Our generalised notion of sum allows us to obtain an analogue of the famil-
iar principle of σ-additivity. In particular, it can be shown that [Benci et al 2013,
section 3.4]:
Proposition 8 (infinite sum rule) If A =
⋃
i∈I Ai, with Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for
all i, j ∈ I, then:
P (A) = lim
λ↑Ω
(Σi∈IP (Ai | λ)).
This natural infinite sum rule holds not only for countable families of events,
but for families of events of any cardinality. This means that NAP functions
have what is called the perfect additivity property.5
The notion of infinite sum also allows us to express the (non-Archimedean)
probability of an event in a new way, namely as:
P (A) =
Σa∈A(w(a))
Σa∈Ω(w(a))
.
3 Relating Popper functions to non-Archimedean
probability functions
The main aim of the present section is to prove the following:
Theorem 9 1. For every finitely additive Popper function on any sample
space, there is a regular NAP function that is point-wise infinitesimally
close to it.
5For a discussion of the virtues of perfect additivity, see [Seidenfeld et al 2014].
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2. For every regular NAP function on any sample space, there is a finitely
additive Popper function that is infinitesimally close to it.
This theorem extends an earlier theorem that was proved by McGee in
[McGee 1994].
The second part of the theorem that we seek to prove is straightforward.
Indeed, it is routine to verify that given any regular non-Archimedean prob-
ability function P , if C(B | A) is defined as
st(
P (B ∧A)
P (A)
)
(where st(a) denotes the unique real number that is closest to a), then C
satisfies the axioms governing Popper functions.
However, the first part of the theorem that we seek to establish is non-
trivial. Given a Popper function on some sample space, we will construct
a suitable NAP function, but the NAP function will not have the same
underlying sample space.
Indeed, the following argument shows that we cannot in general expect
the NAP function to have the same sample space.6 Consider the following
total, regular non-Archimedean (but not NAP !) probability function on N:
P1(A) ≡ ǫ · δ0(A) + (1− ǫ) ·
∑
n∈A∩N0
1
2n
,
where ǫ is some positive infinitesimal and δ0 is the 0−1-valued function such
that for every A ⊆ N, δ0(A) = 1 if 0 ∈ A, and δ0(A) = 0 otherwise. Let C
be the Popper function st(P1). Since P1({0} | {0, 1}) is infinitesimally small,
C({0}, {0, 1}) must be 0. Now for every NAP function P , P ({0} | {0, 1})
6Due to Arthur Pedersen, personal communication.
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must be a real number (different from 0), since {0, 1} is a finite set. So there
can be no NAP function P such that |C({0}, {0, 1})− P ({0} | {0, 1})| is
infinitesimally small.
3.1 McGee’s theorem
McGee effectively proves the following theorem [McGee 1994, p. 181–184]:
Theorem 10 For every Popper function for a propositional language L,
there is a regular non-Archimedean probability function on L that is point-
wise infinitesimally close to it.
The structure of McGee’s proof is roughly as follows.
Let L, and a Popper function C : L× L 7→ R, be given.
Stage 1
Let L1, . . . ,Li, . . . be an enumeration of the finitely generated sub-languages
of L. By “finitely generated language”, McGee means a language that is gen-
erated by the familiar boolean operations from a finite set of basic events.
For each Li, McGee generates a non-Archimedean probability function Pri
defined on Li which is infinitely close to C restricted to Li. In other words,
he generates a probability function for any finitely generated event-algebra
on the sample space Ω.
Van Fraassen has shown how on the basis of the given Popper function
C, for every Li a finite number n of ranks or degrees of infinitesimality are
distinguished [Van Fraassen 1976]. Every rank k is marked by a ‘maximally
probable’ sentence ak ∈ Li of that rank, so that:
• C(b, ak) > 0 for every sentence b of rank k;
18
• C(b, ak) = 0 for every sentence b of rank > k;
• C(ak, b) = 0 for every sentence b of rank < k.
McGee then shows how in terms of these ranks an infinitesimal probability
function Pri can be expressed that is infinitely close to C.
What McGee’s construction shows is effectively that the probability of a
sentences b ∈ Li can be represented as:
Pri(b) = r0 · ǫ
0 + . . .+ rn · ǫ
n,
where ǫ is an infinitesimal number and r0, . . . , rn ∈ [0, 1] [Halpern 2010, sec-
tion 4.1]. (r0 is then st[Pri(b)].)
In other words, Pri(b) can be seen as a finite sequence 〈r0, . . . , rn〉 of clas-
sical probability values. These finite sequences are lexicographically ordered.
So the non-archimedean probabilities for Li can be given a lexicographical
representation.
Stage 2
In the second part of the proof, an ultrafilter on the index set of the Li’s
yields ultraproduct model Pr for the whole of L. By the fact that for each
i, j,
Pri(b | a) ≈ C(b, a) ≈ Prj(b | a),
we have that Pr(b | a) ≈ C(b | a), and we are done.
Note, incidentally, that the function Pr is not given as a triple 〈Ω,U , w〉,
so the non-Archimedean function that McGee produces is not an NAP func-
tion. Also, the function Pr is only finitely additive, and not countably addi-
tive.
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McGee then reflects on the familiar notion of σ-additivity [McGee 1994,
p. 184]:
For some purposes, it is useful to look at sentential calculi in
which we can form infinite conjunctions and disjunctions and
probability measures that are countably additive, rather than
merely finitely additive. Thus, we may add to the definition of a
Popper function this following requirement:
If b is the disjunction of a0, a1, a2, . . . and if ai ∧ aj
is inconsistent whenever i 6= j, then C(b, c) = Σ∞i=0C(ai, c)
For the corresponding condition in terms of nonstandard proba-
bility assignments, the first thing that comes to mind is nonsen-
sical:
If b is the disjunction of a0, a1, a2, . . . and if ai ∧ aj
is inconsistent whenever i 6= j, then P (b) = Σ∞i=0P (ai)
The nonstandard model of analysis will not be topologically com-
plete, and thus this infinite sum will not normally exist. Instead,
the condition we require is:
If b is the disjunction of a0, a1, a2, . . . and if ai ∧ aj
is inconsistent whenever i 6= j, then P (b) ≈ Σ∞i=0P (ai)
It follows immediately from [theorem 10] that with these two
additional requirements, the two approaches will again coincide.
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Of course McGee is right that in a non-Archimedean context, σ-additivity
cannot be the right infinite additivity rule.7 But this not a valid reason for
retreating to insisting only that the infinite sum (in the Weierstrass sense)
of the probabilities and the probability of the infinite union should agree
up to an infinitesimal. Indeed, we expect from our theory of probability
that the probability of an infinite sum is exactly computable on the basis of
the probabilities of its components: the probability of an infinite union of a
family of events should be expressible as an infinite sum of the probabilities
of the events in the family. We have seen in the previous section how, using
a generalised limit concept, non-Archimedean probability functions are able
to do this.
We have noted that NAP does have a natural infinite additivity rule.
Indeed, NAP satisfies perfect additivity. So our representation theorem 9
is a substantial strengthening of McGee’s theorem 10. We now turn to the
proof of the main theorem.
3.2 Finitely generated languages
In this section we start, as McGee does [McGee 1994, p. 181–183], by proving
the result for finitely generated languages, and then in the next section we
will use this to construct an NAP space for an arbitrary language (giving
part 1 of Theorem 9, and so completing our main theorem). The construction
of the NAP function in this section is fairly hands on, and mathematically
not very difficult.
First we look at the language which describes the events. Let Lf be
7The reasons for this are explained in [Wenmackers and Horsten 2013].
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a finitely generated propositional language. So Lf has a finite number of
atomic propositions, and is closed under the Boolean operations of conjunc-
tion, disjunction and negation. As Lf is finitely generated we can choose
b1, b2, . . . , bm from Lf such that:
1. bi ∧ bj ↔ ⊥ for all i, j ≤ m with i 6= j
2. ⊤ ↔ b1 ∨ b2 ∨ · · · ∨ bm
3. For any sentence a of Lf which is not a contradiction, there exists
{i1, . . . ik} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , m} such that a↔ bi1 ∨ · · · ∨ bik
So the bi’s are the most fine-grained description of the “state of the world”
that our language can give. Let us call these the normal atoms of the lan-
guage (noting they are not necessarily atomic propositions). We call a sen-
tence normal if it is the disjunction of bi’s; it is clear from the above argument
that each sentence is equivalent to a normal sentence.
Now suppose we have a Popper function C : Lf × Lf → R. For any
sentences a, b of Lf , C(a, b) is to be interpreted as the probability of a condi-
tional on b. We will assume that the Popper function is regular in the sense
that the only x’s such that C(., x) is the constant function 1 are contradic-
tions (and any atomic proposition is not a contradiction). However, this is
not an important constraint as all such sentences that are not contradictions
can still be interpreted as the empty event, which will receive probability
zero.
We now wish to construct a NAP space with probability function P
which will agree with the Popper function C up to an infinitesimal differ-
ence. To define an NAP space we have seen that (section 2) it is sufficient
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to assign a sample space Ω, a weight function w : Ω → R+ and a directed
set Λ of finite subsets of Ω. In order to compare a Popper function defined
on a propositional language (where events are just propositions) to an NAP
function defined on a sample space (where events are subsets of that sample
space) we must also specify the interpretation of the propositions within the
sample space. Then for any sentences a, b of Lf if a¯, b¯ ⊆ Ω are their interpre-
tations we want P to be such that st(P (a¯|b¯)) = C(a, b). Contradictions will
be interpreted as the empty set, and tautologies as the full sample space, but
for the details we first define the sample space Ω.
We follow McGee’s construction at first ([McGee 1994, p. 182]), although
in slightly different terms. Define a0 to be the normal equivalent of a tautol-
ogy. Set ak+1 to be the disjunction of all bi’s such that bi logically entails ak
and C(bi, ak) = 0. Set rk(C) to be the largest n such that an is defined (i.e.
where there are normal atoms bi with C(bi, an−1) = 0). To see that rk(C)
is well defined, note that as there are only finitely many normal atoms, and
Popper functions are finitely additive, each ak must be the disjunction of
strictly fewer normal atoms than the previous one. We call rk(C) the rank
of the Popper function [Van Fraassen 1976] and also set, for each bi, rk(bi)
to be the least k such that C(bi, ak) > 0.
We now depart from McGee to carry out the construction of the NAP
space. Importantly, as mentioned above, we need to give a sample space
which is not simply the normal atoms of the language. Instead we will in-
terpret each normal atom by an infinite subset of the sample space. We also
specify the weight function and a directed set, and this triple will then yield
the NAP function. After this, we need to check that the probabilities as-
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signed agree with the Popper function up to infinitesimals. The construction
of the NAP function is fairly straightforward, and it is intuitive to see why
it will work, though the proof is not quick.
Sample space: We set Ω = ℵ0
Interpretation: For the interpretation of Lf it is enough to assign each
bi to a subset of Ω, as then the interpretation of any proposition a of Lf will
just be the union of the interpretations of each bi that compose the normal
equivalent of a. To do this we assign each bi to a set b¯i such that |b¯i| = ℵ0,
each b¯i is disjoint from the other b¯i’s, and
⋃
{b¯i : i ∈ {1, 2, . . .m}} = Ω (so
all the points in the sample space are assigned to some bi).
Weight function: We define w : Ω→ R+, by
w(x) = C(bi, ak) where x ∈ b¯i and k = rk(bi)
Note that this is well defined as for x ∈ Ω there is a unique bi such that
x ∈ b¯i, and by definition of rk(bi) we have w(x) > 0.
Directed set: To show agreement with the Popper function, we will use
a directed set Λ such that all λ ∈ Λ satisfy the following two properties:
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . .m} rk(bi) = rk(bj)→ |b¯i ∩ λ| = |b¯j ∩ λ| (7)
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . .m} rk(bi) < rk(bj)→ |b¯i ∩ λ| > |b¯j ∩ λ|
2 (8)
Property 7 will ensure that conditional probabilities using propositions that
are all of the same rank agree with the Popper function (in fact they will
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be the same, not just infinitesimally close), and property 8 will ensure that
propositions with a lower rank will dominate, so those of a higher rank only
make an infinitesimal difference.
Lemma 11 We can find Λ ⊂ Pfin(Ω) such that properties (7) and (8) hold
for every λ ∈ Λ.
Proof. This is easy as we can just take
Λ = {λ ∈ Pfin(Ω) : λ satisfies (7) and (8)}
Then Λ is directed: any x ∈ Ω can be incorporated into such a set so
⋃
Λ = Ω,
and for any λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ it is straightforward to expand λ1 ∪ λ2 to satisfy (7)
and (8).
Now we have defined an NAP space (up to the choice of ultrafilter UΛ,
but any choice will have the properties we need) and so we have specified an
NAP function P : P(Ω) → R∗. So now we need to show that P , the NAP
function, agrees with C, the Popper function, up to the standard part. This
takes rather more work than one might expect, becoming fairly technical but
the intuition is in 7 and 8 above.
We start with a simple case where we are just dealing with normal atoms
of the same rank.8
Lemma 12 For any normal atom bi and b = bi∨ bj1 ∨ · · ·∨ bjk with rk(bi) =
rk(bj1) = · · · = rk(bjk) we have
P (bi|b) = C(bi, b) (9)
8Henceforth we just use, e.g. b for b¯, which will be unambiguous.
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So in this case the value given by the NAP function is actually the same as
that given by the Popper function, not just infinitesimally close.
Proof. We have for all λ ∈ Λ
P (bi ∩ λ)
P (b ∩ λ)
=
∑
x∈bi∩λ
w(x)
∑
x∈b∩λw(x)
by definition of P
=
|bi ∩ λ|C(bi, ark(bi))∑
bj∈b
|bj ∩ λ|C(bj, ark(bi))
by definition of w
=
C(bi, ark(bi))∑
bj∈b
C(bj , ark(bi))
by (7)
=
C(bi, ark(bi))
C(b, ark(bi))
= C(bi, b) by (2) and (3) of Popper functions.
This property is then preserved in the Ω-limit.
We are now ready to show we have agreement up to an infinitesimal in
the general case:
Theorem 13 For any a, b ∈ L we have
C(a, b) = st(
P (a¯ ∩ b¯)
P (b¯)
) (10)
Proof. Fix a, b ∈ L. We have
P (a|b) =
P (a ∩ b)
P (b)
=
∑
bi∈a∩b
P (bi)
P (b)
=
∑
bi∈a∩b
P (bi)
P (b)
as P is finitely additive.
Let d be the minimum rank of all the normal atoms in b. We will see that
only the normal atoms of this rank are relevant for the standard part. Set bd
to be the union of all the normal atoms bj of rank d and b>d to be the union
of all those with rank greater than d, so b = bd ∪ b>d. Now we have for bi in
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b:
P (bi|b) =
P (bi)
P (bd)
P (bd)
P (b)
Now for any λ ∈ Λ, taking k to be the number of bi’s in b>d, by property (8)
of Λ we have
k2|bd ∩ λ| > |b>d ∩ λ|
2 ⇒ k2|b ∩ λ| > |b>d ∩ λ|
2
Now by property (7) and the definition of the weight function we have:
P (b>d ∩ λ)
P (b ∩ λ)
=
|b>d ∩ λ|
∑
bi∈b>d
C(bi, ark(bi))
|bd ∩ λ|
∑
bi∈b
C(bi, ark(bi))
but
M =
∑
bi∈b>d
C(bi, ark(bi))∑
bi∈b
C(bi, ark(bi))
is constant for any λ so
P (b>d ∩ λ)
P (b ∩ λ)
=M
|b>d ∩ λ|
|bd ∩ λ|
< Mk2
|b>d ∩ λ|
|b>d ∩ λ|2
=Mk2
1
|b>d ∩ λ|
Thus we have for any n ∈ N we can choose µ ∈ Λ such that:
∀λ ∈ Λ with λ ⊇ µ
P (b>d ∩ λ)
P (b ∩ λ)
< 1/n
By preservation to the Λ limit (fineness) this implies st(P (b>d)
P (b)
) = 0 and
so st(P (bd)
P (b)
) = 1 by standard laws of probability.
Then
st(P (bi|b)) = st
P (bi)
P (bd)
P (bd)
P (b)
= st
P (bi)
P (bd)
st
P (bd)
P (b)
= st(P (bi|bd))
Going back to the general case,
P (a|b) =
∑
bi∈a∩b
P (bi)
P (b)
=
∑
bi∈a∩bd
P (bi)
P (b)
+
∑
bi∈a∩b>d
P (bi)
P (b)
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and the latter term is infinitesimal, as it is less than P (b>d)
P (b)
. Now we can
apply lemma 12: taking the standard part (and noting the sums here are all
finite) we get
st(P (a|b)) = st
∑
bi∈a∩bd
P (bi)
P (b)
= st
∑
bi∈a∩bd
P (bi)
P (bd)
=
∑
bi∈a∩bd
C(bi, bd)
Now C(bi, bd) = C(bi, b) as by axiom 3. of Popper functions C(bi, b) =
C(bi, bd)C(bd, b) and C(bd, b) = 1. So we must have:
∑
bi∈a∩bd
C(bi, bd) =
∑
bi∈a∩bd
C(bi, b) = C(a, b)
Putting this all together we get
st(P (a|b)) = C(a, b)
as required.
Thus part 1 of Theorem 9 is proved.
We now describe a slight extension of this construction which we will use
to construct an NAP space for an infinite language. Let Li be a finitely
generated language with {b1 . . . bm} the normal atoms and (Ωi, wi,Λi) be the
NAP space generated as above. Let a¯i ⊂ Ωi be the interpretation of the
proposition a of Li. Suppose we have a different language Lp (which may
not be finitely generated, and may include some of the propositions of L)
interpreted on a domain Ωp (which may be uncountable), and let a¯
p ⊂ Ωp be
the interpretation of the proposition a of Lp. Suppose we also have a weight
function wp : Ωp → R
+.
We take L to be the language generated by the atomic propositions of
Li and Lp augmented by the atomic proposition p not in either Li or Lp
(p stands for ‘previous’), and define a new NAP space as follows. We set
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Ω = Ωi∪Ωp (assuming Ωi and Ωp are disjoint, otherwise we could make them
so be introducing an index), and the give the elements the same weighting
as before so w(x) = wi(x) if x ∈ Ωi and w(x) = wp(x) if x ∈ Ωp. We
interpret p as Ωp ⊂ Ω and any other atomic a in L as a¯
i∪ a¯p (where a¯x = ∅ if
a /∈ Lx). Note that for each of the normal atoms bjs of Li there is a sentence
b′j = bi ∧ ¬p of L which has the interpretation b¯j as before.
We want st(P (p|a)) = 0 if a is a non-contradictory proposition of Lf , so
we treat p as having a rank greater than any of the normal atoms of Li: so
we can define a directed set Λ on Ω in the same way as in Lemmas 11, such
that Λ satisfies (7) and (8) as above, and in addition |b¯j ∩ λ| > |p¯ ∩ λ|
2 for
any normal atom bj of Li.
Let P be the NAP function defined by (Ω, w,Λ). It then follows that for
any a and b in Li we have st(P (a|b)) = C(a, b). To see this we can just treat
p as an extra normal atom and the argument before will go through, as any
a or b in Li that is not a contradiction will be implied by one of the bi’s, so
st(P (a)) = st(P (a ∧ ¬p)) and st(P (b)) = st(P (b ∧ ¬p)). Thus:
st(P (a|b)) = st(
P (a ∧ p) + P (a ∧ ¬p)
P (b ∧ p) + P (b ∧ ¬p)
) = st(
P (a ∧ ¬p)
P (b ∧ ¬p)
) = C(a, b)
3.3 Infinitely generated languages
In this section we demonstrate how to extend the above result to an arbi-
trary language L. McGee uses an ultraproduct construction to do this, but
his straightforward approach9 will not work here. The problem is that taking
an ultraproduct will yield a weight function taking values in a non-standard
9The ultraproduct construction in itself is not exactly simple, but its application is well
developed, and a standard technique in model theory.
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extension of the real numbers, which is not how NAP works.10 The con-
struction given here is rather different, although ultraproduct techniques are
employed. Readers who are not familiar with ultrafilters and ultraproducts
may skip this proof, as it is somewhat technical, and the basic idea is re-
ally the same is taking an ultraproduct: we combine, with some interesting
mathematics, the models for finitely generated sublanguages into a model for
the whole language.
Let L be an infinitely generated propositional language and C a Popper
function on L. Let κ = |L| and 〈iα : α < κ〉 be a wellordering of all finite
systems of atomic sentences from L. For each α < κ let Liα be the language
generated by the atomic propositions in iα, so each finitely generated sub-
language of L is just some Liα.
It is easy to see that for every for every finitely generated sublanguage Liα
we can construct is an NAP space (Ωiα , wiα, IΛiα ) which satisfies standard
part agreement (10) - we simply apply the method of the previous section for
the language Liα and the Popper function C restricted to this sublanguage.
We now build a new NAP space from these.
The sample space: set
Ω = {〈x, α〉 : x ∈ Ωiα} =
⋃
α<κ
(Ωiα × {α})
10There is no prima facie reason why NAP should not be extended to allow for this,
after all the same additivity principle could be introduced in such a space, so that the
probability values would take values in a further extension of the real numbers. However,
how we could get the infinite additivity properties of NAP in the ultraproduct is not
obvious.
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Essentially Ω is just the union of all the Ωi’s - the ordered pair construction
is just to make sure the elements for different sublanguages are kept distinct.
The interpretation: For any proposition a in L the interpretation of
a is {〈x, α〉 : a ∈ Liα ∧ x ∈ a¯iα} where a¯i is the interpretation of a in our
model for Li. Note that this is consistent with Ω being the interpretation of
a tautology.
The weight function: For 〈x, α〉 ∈ Ω set w(〈x, α〉) = wiα(x). Clearly
this is well defined on all of Ω and always strictly positive.
A directed set?
Here we must switch our approach from simply using a directed set, where
any ultrafilter including that directed set will give the desired properties, to
actually using the ultrafilter directly.
For each α < κ we will define an NAP space (Ωα, wα,Λα), distinct from
(Ωiα , wiα,Λiα) above, except for in the first case where we set (Ω0, w0,Λ0) =
(Ωi0 , wi0, IΛi0 ). For α > 0 we construct the NAP space as in the extension
at the end of the previous section. Take Li, Ωi etc. there as Liα, Ωiα × {α}
etc.
We take Lpα etc. to encompass the previous finite sublanguages, being
the language generated by all the atomic propositions of the Liβ for β < α.
Set Ωpα =
⋃
β<α〈Ωiβ × {β}〉, the interpretation of any a in Lpα just as on Ω
but restricted to Ωpα, and wpα = w ↾ Ωpα .
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Then following the earlier construction we have Ωα = Ωiα ∪ Ωpα =
⋃
β≤α〈Ωiβ × {β}〉 ⊂ Ω and wα = w ↾ Ωα. Set Λα to be the directed set
as constructed there and take Uα to be a corresponding ultrafilter. Note that
the probability function Pα generated by the NAP space (Ωα, wα,Uα) will
satisfy standard part agreement (10) for any propositions from Liα, although
not necessarily for all propositions in Liα ∪ Lpα.
We construct the ultrafilter for our full NAP space from these Uα to-
gether with an ultrafilter on κ. Let U˜ be an ultrafilter on κ such that for
each atomic proposition a from L, {α ∈ κ : a ∈ Liα} ∈ U˜
11 and note that all
end-seqments {α ∈ κ : α > β} are in U˜ . This is because, as L has κ many
atomic propositions, for any β < κ there is some proposition a ∈ L which is
not in any Liα for α < β.
Now we can define the ultrafilter U on Pfin(Ω) which we will use for our
NAP space. First to ease notation, for X ⊂ Pfin(Ω) set Xα := X∩Pfin(Ωα).
Define U ⊂ P(Pfin(Ω)) by
X ∈ U ↔ {α : Xα ∈ Uα} ∈ U˜
Lemma 14 U is a non-principal ultrafilter, and U is fine.
Proof.
11This is possible as such sets have the finite intersection property and so can be extended
to an ultrafilter [Goldblatt 1998].
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1. supersets
Let Y ⊆ Ω, X ⊆ Y . Then we have Yi ⊇ Xi for all α so
X ∈ U ⇒ {α : Xα ∈ Uα} ∈ U˜ ⇒ {α : Yα ∈ Uα} ∈ U˜ ⇒ Y ∈ U
where the first and third implications are simply by definition, and the
second as each Uα is an ultrafilter.
2. intersection
Let X, Y ∈ U . We have (X ∩ Y )α = Xα ∩ Yα so:
{α : Xα ∈ Uα}, {α : Yα ∈ Uα} ∈ U˜ ⇒ {α : Xα ∈ Uα ∧ Yα ∈ Uα} ∈ U˜
⇒ {α : Xα ∩ Yα ∈ Uα} ∈ U˜ ⇒ X ∩ Y ∈ U
where the first implication is because U˜ is an ultrafilter and the second
because all the Uα’s are.
3. ultra
First note that Ωα \Xα = (Ω \X)α. Thus
X ∈ U ⇔ {α : Xα ∈ Uα} ∈ U˜ ⇔ {α : X
c
α /∈ Ui} ∈ U˜
⇔ {α : Xcα ∈ Uα} /∈ U˜ ⇔ X
c /∈ U
4. non-principal
It is enough to show that no finite set is in U (see [Goldblatt 1998,
p. 38]). But this is clear as X finite⇒ {α : Xα 6= ∅} is finite⇒ X /∈ U .
5. fine Let x ∈ Ω. Then there is some α ∈ κ such that x ∈ Ωiα , so
then x ∈ Ωβ for all β ≥ α. Let X = {y ∈ Pfin(Ω) : x ∈ y}. Then
Xβ = {y ∈ Pfin(Ωβ) : x ∈ y} so as each Uβ is fine, for all β ≥ α we
have Xβ ∈ Uβ and thus X ∈ U .
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Now we have defined anNAP space (Ω, w,U), so we set P : Pfin(Ω)→ R
∗
to be the corresponding NAP function. It remains to show that for any a, b
from L we have st(P (a|b)) = C(a, b).
To do this we exploit an alternative interpretation of the NAP function
generated from above. In the section on NAP we defined P (a) to be the
ultrafilter equivalence class of sequence 〈P (a|λ) : λ ∈ Pfin(Ω)〉, but we can
also think of P (a) as the ultraproduct of Pα(a) under the ultrafilter U˜ . To
see this is equivalent, first we need to see that the hyperreal fields generated
by the two processes are the same. But this is straightforward: For any
functions ϕ, ψ : Pfin(Ω)→ R we have:
ϕ ≈U ψ ⇔ ∃Q ∈ U , ∀λ ∈ Q, ϕ(λ) = ψ(λ)
⇔ ∃Q˜ ∈ U˜ , ∀α ∈ Q˜, ∃X ∈ Uα, ∀λ ∈ X, ϕ(λ) = ψ(λ)
⇔ ∃Q˜ ∈ U˜ , ∀α ∈ Q,ϕ ≈Uα ψ ⇔ [ϕ] ≈U˜ [ψ]
where we take [ϕ](α) = [ϕ]Uα , so [ϕ] is the function taking α to the equiv-
alence class of ϕ under Uα. It is not hard to see that this reasoning shows
the hyperreal fields generated by the two processes are isomorphic under the
obvious mapping. Thus it makes sense to ask whether
P (a) = [Pα(a)]U˜ .
This does in fact hold as by definition of U˜ we have {α : a ∈ Liα} ∈ U˜ and
for any α with a in Lα the definition of the NAP function gives Pα(a|λ) =
P (a|λ) = Σx∈a∩λ(w(x))
Σx∈λ(w(x))
, so these are the same function on a set in the ultrafilter
U˜ .
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We have gone to all this trouble because in order to show P agrees with
the Popper function C we will use the fact that the functions Pα agree with
C, and then, using the latter presentation, apply  Los’ Theorem, which states
that any first-order sentence φ that holds in ultrafilter-many models will also
be true in the ultraproduct model. Now for the detail.
Fix a, b in L and set r = C(a, b). Let the first order (not propositional)
language L′ include the language of real analysis plus constant terms ‘pa∧b’,
‘pb’ and ‘tr’, and the unary predicate N . We define models Mα: set the
domain Dα to be the nonstandard reals produced by the ultrafilter Uα. Give
the language of real analysis its normal interpretation over the hypereals,
and set Iα(tr) = r, Iα(N) = N (the true natural numbers, not their non-
standard extension under Uα) and where a, b ∈ Liα set Iα(pa∧b) = Pα(a ∩ b)
and Iα(pb) = Pα(b) and be arbitrary otherwise. Now for each α such that
a, b ∈ Liα we have from our construction of Pα that st(Pα(a|b)) = r, so for
such α’s we have:
Mα  “∀n ∈ N
∣∣∣∣
pa∧b
pb
− tr
∣∣∣∣ < 1/n”
Now set M to be the model attained by taking the ultraproduct of the
models Mα under the ultrafilter U˜ . As {α < κ : a, b ∈ Liα} is in U˜ ,  Los’
Theorem tells us that the above sentence interpreted in the ultraproduct
model will also hold, i.e.
M  “∀n ∈ N
∣∣∣∣
pa∧b
pb
− tr
∣∣∣∣ < 1/n”
What is the ultraproduct model? The members of the domain are the U˜
equivalence classes of sequences of objects 〈a : a ∈ Dα〉, so by the earlier
discussion these are exactly the hyperreals generated by U . The interpreta-
tion on constants in L′ is straightforward, I(tr) = [〈Iα(tr) : α < κ〉]U˜ etc.
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So again by the earlier discussion we see that I(pb) = [Pα(b)]U˜ = P (b) and
I(pa∧b) = [Pα(a ∩ b)]U˜ = P (a ∩ b). The interpretation of N in the ultra-
product model will be a non-standard extension of the natural numbers, but
importantly it will include all of N so we can conclude that:
∀n ∈ N,
∣∣∣∣
P (a ∧ b)
P (b)
− r
∣∣∣∣ < 1/n
In other words,
st(
P (a ∧ b)
P (b)
) = r = C(a, b)
So we’re done.
3.4 Discussion
The upshot is that for every Popper function C(x, y), there is an NAP
function P that is pointwise infinitely close to C. But in the present context,
this leaves considerable latitude for the answer to the question: how close is
P to C?
We have seen that for every r ∈ R, we can find in R∗ hyperreals that are
of different degrees of infinitesimal closeness to r. We have shown that the
infinitesimal closeness of the NAP function P that we have constructed to
the Popper function C that was given is at least pointwise of rank 1. But one
might well ask12 whether P can be chosen in such a way that its closeness
to C is pointwise always of a higher rank. We leave this as a question for
further research.
12Indeed: an anonymous referee did ask.
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4 Non-Archimedean probabilities and lexico-
graphic probabilities
In section 3.1 we noted that for finitely generated languages Li, any value
Pri(A) of a non-Archimedean probability function can be given a lexico-
graphic representation as a finite sequence of classical real-valued probability
values. In the literature on lexicographical probabilities, generalised proba-
bilities are sometimes considered that represent probabilities as ω-sequences
of classical real-valued probability values.13 The naive conjecture that non-
Archimedean probability functions for (countably) infinitely generated lan-
guages can be represented as an ω-sequence of classical real-valued prob-
ability values has been shown to be incorrect [Halpern 2010, example 4.8,
example 4.10].
The problem is, roughly, one of non-well-foundedness.14 We have seen in
section 3.1 that the terms in the polynomial expression of Pri(A) represents a
‘level of infinitesimality’. But (as we shall shortly see), the collection of ranks
for an infinitely generated language does not in general form a well-ordering.
So we will represent NAP probability values lexicographically as non-well-
ordered sequences of real numbers. We will concentrate on the simplified case
of NAP functions that have no associated weight function, or, equivalently,
for which the associated weight function is constant 1.
13For a discussion of the theory of lexicographic probabilities, see [Blume et al 1991].
14Halpern briefly discusses the idea of non-well-founded lexicographical probability func-
tions in [Halpern 2010, p. 165], and dismisses it.
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4.1 Extending van Fraassen’s notion of rank
First we extend van Fraassen’s definition of the notion of rank to NAP
functions P .
Let F be the non-Archimedean field of which ran(P ) is a substructure.
Then:
Definition 15 ∀a, b,∈ F : a ≈rk b ≡ ∃r ∈ F :∞ > |st[r]| 6= 0 and a = r · b
So numbers in the field F are of the same rank if they are not infinitely small
or infinitely large with respect to each other.
It is immediate that ≈rk is an equivalence relation. So we define ranks as
equivalence classes of ≈rk:
Definition 16 ∀a ∈ F : rk(a) ≡ [a]≈rk , and R ≡ {rk(a) : a ∈ F}.
Thus ranks can be seen as locally Archimedean substructures of the non-
Archimedean field F .
R is a generalisation of van Fraassen’s notion of rank to infinitely gen-
erated languages. The elements of R are linearly ordered in a natural way
(induced by the linear ordering on F ): the higher the rank of a number, the
larger its ‘degree of infinitesimality’, and the probability value 0 ∈ F can be
seen as the unique element of F of maximal rank 0. But this natural ordering
on R is not in general a well-ordering.
We define the rank rk(A) of an event A ⊆ Ω as rk(P (A)).
Now we arbitrarily choose, for each α ∈ R, a positive rank unit value 1α
of rank α.
Let an NAP function P be given. We want to define a lexicographical
representation of P . For every A ⊆ Ω, we want to define a lexicographial
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ordering <L such that
∀A,B ⊆ Ω : P (A) < P (B)⇔ P (A) <L P (B).
4.2 Transfinite sums of elements of F
The idea is to approximate P (A) by means of a well-ordered (and generally
transfinite) sequence of approximations. The definition of these approxima-
tions involves transfinite sums of elements of F . So for our construction we
will need a notion of sum of elements of F that makes sense also for all trans-
finite α. We define an appropriate notion of sum using a second ultrafilter
construction (recognising that F itself was already generated by an ultrafilter
construction).
Let µ be an ordinal that is chosen (with foresight) to be large enough to
enumerate the stages of approximation of elements of F .
Definition 17
Sα ≡ {S ∈ [µ]
<ω : α ≤ min(S)}
S ≡ {Sα : α}
Clearly S has the finite intersection property. So let U∗ be an ultrafilter
on [µ]<ω extending S. Then U∗ can be taken to determine an appropriate
notion of sum in the following way.
We define sums
∑
α<β f(α), with β ≤ µ, inductively. So we assume
∑
α<β0
f(α) to be defined already for all β0 < β, and define
∑
α<β f(α).
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Definition 18 Let f be any function from β to F . For any S ∈ [β]<ω with
β0 = min(S), let
f(S) ≡
∑
α<β0
f(α) +
∑
α∈S\{β0}
f(α).
Then f(S) is a finite sum of elements of F , which is of course well-defined
because F is a field.
Now we identify modulo agreement on the ultrafilter U∗:
Definition 19 For any functions f, g from β to F :
f ∼ g ≡ {S ∈ [µ]<ω : f(S) = g(S)} ∈ U∗.
This partitions the functions f from µ to F into equivalence classes [f ]U∗ ,
and they form a non-Archimedean field F ∗ into which F is canonically em-
bedded in the same way as R is embedded in F .
Now we set:
Definition 20
∑
α<β
f(β) ≡ ⌈[f ]U∗⌉F ,
where ⌈a∗⌉F is the unique element a ∈ F that is closest to the element
a∗ ∈ F ∗.
Not all such sums will be well-defined. Intuitively, it may be the case
that | [f ]U∗ | is “infinitely large” with respect to all elements of F , in the
same way that some elements of F are “infinitely large” with respect to
all elements of R. But if [f ]U∗ is bounded from below and from above by
elements of F as canonically embedded in F ∗, then the sum is well-defined,
because of transfer. The argument goes as follows. Using the ∗-notation
from non-standard analysis, we move from the R to the non-Archimedean
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field R∗ = F and then to R∗ = F ∗. Then using this ∗-notation, we know
from the completeness of the real field that
∀r∗ ∈ R∗∃r ∈ R∀s ∈ R : s 6= r →| r∗ − s |>| r∗ − r | .
By ∗-transfer, this yields:
∀r∗∗ ∈ R∗∗∃r∗ ∈ R∗∀s∗ ∈ R∗ : s∗ 6= r∗ →| r∗∗ − s∗ |>| r∗∗ − r∗ | .
4.3 Approximations
Now we are ready to define the approximations. Let a NAP function P and
an event A ⊆ Ω be given.
The idea is to approximate P (A) as follows. P (A) is of a certain rank
rk(A): call this rank 0A (“the rank of the 0th approximation of A”). So we
will in a first stage approximate P (A) by the element A0 · 10A where A0 ∈ R
is such that A0 · 10A is closest to P (A). But then it is likely that there is a
non-zero remainder P (A)−A0 · 10A. This remainder will then be of a higher
rank 1A than 0A. So we will approximate the remainder by the element of
the form A1A · 11A , with A1A the unique real number such that that A1A · 11A
is closest to the remainder. This will leave us with a remainder of a still
higher rank. Thus we continue into the transfinite.
The details of the construction go as follows.
We define the remainders and the approximating real numbers induc-
tively. We take them to be defined for all α < β, and then first define the
remainder of stage β:
Definition 21
Arβ ≡ P (A)−
∑
α<β
Aα · 1αA
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This remainder will be of a certain rank:
Definition 22
1βA ≡ rk(A
r
β)
On the basis of this, we then define the approximation of P (A) at stage
β:
Definition 23 Aβ is the unique r ∈ R such that r · 1βA is closer to A
r
β than
any number of the form s · 1βA for s ∈ R such that s 6= r
Of course these definitions are only well-formed if the sums involved (def-
inition 21) are well-defined. But this is the case:
Proposition 24 For all β < µ, Arβ is well-defined.
Proof. By transfinite induction on β. We use boundedness considerations
that hold for ultrafilter-large families of finite sets and are then globally pre-
served.
Proposition 25 Arβ+1 = A
r
β −Aβ · 1βA
Proof. The reason is that Sβ ∈ U
∗ (degenerate case).
Lemma 26 If rk(Arα) 6= 0, then α < β ≤ µ⇒ rk(A
r
α) < rk(A
r
β).
Proof. Induction on β.
1. β = γ + 1. By the previous proposition and the definition of Aγ we have
rk(Arγ+1) > rk(A
r
γ). The result then follows by the induction hypothesis.
2. Lim(β). Let α < β. Then by the induction hypothesis we have rk(Arα) <
rk(Arα+1). So it suffices to show that rk(A
r
β) ≥ rk(A
r
α+1).
Since Sα+1 ∈ U
∗, we want to show that for each S ∈ Sα+1, we have
rk(P (A)−
∑
γ∈S
Aγ · 1γA) ≥ rk(P (A)−
∑
γ<α+1
Aγ · 1γA).
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We only need to look at those S such that min(S) < β, since only they
can contribute to the sums. By the induction hypothesis, for such S we have
rk(P (A)−
∑
γ<min(S)
Aγ · 1γA) ≥ rk(P (A)−
∑
γ<α+1
Aγ · 1γA).
This entails that indeed
rk(P (A)−
∑
S
Aγ · 1γA) ≥ rk(P (A)−
∑
γ<α+1
Aγ · 1γA).
So there must for simple cardinality reasons be an ordinal ζ such that
rk(Arζ) = 0. Then ζ is called the closure ordinal for A. In a similar vein, the
closure ordinal of P , denoted as cl(P ), is defined as
max{α : α is the closure ordinal of some A ⊆ Ω}15
This means that the NAP functions on Ω yield an ordinal spectrum that is
determined by their closure ordinals.
Theorem 27
P (A) =
∑
α<cl(A)
Aα · 1αA
Proof. Consider the closure ordinal ζ of A, which must exist by lemma 26.
Then we have
P (A)−
∑
β<ζ
Aβ · 1βA = 0.
15In fact, we have a notion of closure ordinal for each r ∈ F . So we could also define
the closure of P as max{α : α is the closure ordinal of some r ∈ F}.
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Of course we can then also express P (A) as
∑
α<cl(P )Aα · 1αA.
The infinite sum
∑
α<cl(A)Aα ·1αA can be seen as a kind of Cantor normal
form for P (A).16 The upshot of our discussion is that even though the
structure R of the ranks is non-wellfounded, every probability value can be
expressed as a well-founded infinite sum of components of increasing rank.
4.4 Representation theorem
The infinite sum
∑
α<cl(A)Aα ·1αA can be seen as a lexicographic presentation
of P (A). It can be used to define a lexicographical ordering:
Definition 28 (lexicographic order) P (A) <L P (B) ≡ for the smallest
α such that Aα · 1αA 6= Bα · 1αB , we have Aα · 1αA < Bα · 1αB
It is immediate that <L is a strict linear ordering.
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 29 (representation theorem)
∀A,B ⊆ Ω : P (A) < P (B)⇔ P (A) <L P (B).
Proof.
We know from theorem 27 that P (A) =
∑
α<cl(P )Aα · 1αA and P (B) =
∑
α<cl(P )Bα · 1αB .
(⇒) We are given that P (A) < P (B). Let α be the first ordinal where P (A)
and P (B) differ. Then we want to show that
Aα · 1αA < Bα · 1αB .
16In a somewhat related (but also significantly different) context, the connection between
a non-Archimedean notion of size and Cantor normal forms is explored in [Benci et al 2006,
section 1.5].
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Suppose, for a contradiction, that this is not the case, i.e., that
Aα · 1αA > Bα · 1αB .
We will show that then, for all S ∈ Sα:
∑
S
Aα · 1αA >
∑
S
Bα · 1αB .
We aim to show this by an induction on min(S).
1. Suppose α = min(S). Then the property holds by lemma 26.
2. Suppose the property holds for all S ∈ Sα such that min(S) < β. Then we
want to show that the property also holds for all S ∈ Sα such that min(S) = β.
2a. Suppose β = γ + 1. For A, we know that
∑
κ<β
Aκ · 1κA =
∑
κ<γ
Aκ · 1κA + Aγ · 1γA,
and similarly for B. So the property follows by the induction hypothesis and
lemma 26.
2b. Lim(β). It suffices to show
∑
κ<β
Aκ · 1κA >
∑
κ<β
Bκ · 1κB .
But by the induction hypothesis, this holds on all S ∈ Sα, and Sα ∈ U
∗, so
this indeed holds also.
From this inductive argument we conclude that for all S ∈ Sα,
∑
S
Aα · 1αA >
∑
S
Bα · 1αB .
So, since Sα ∈ U
∗,
P (A) =
∑
α<cl(P )
Aα · 1αA >
∑
α<cl(P )
Bα · 1αB = P (B),
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which gives us the required contradiction.
(⇐) This follows by a similar argument. It is given that P (A) <L P (B).
Then there is a first α such that
Aα · 1αA < Bα · 1αB .
Then we argue inductively that
∑
α<cl(P )
Aα · 1αA <
∑
α<cl(P )
Bα · 1αB ,
and we are done.
Note that this implies that even though a choice of ultrafilter U∗ was needed
to define <L, the resulting ordering is invariant with respect to this choice
of ultrafilter.
4.5 Discussion
Let a sample space Ω be given. Then an ultrafilter on Pfin(Ω) determines a
NAP function P (with ‘uniform weight 1’). Different such NAP functions
may have different closure ordinals in the sense of section 4.3. Intuitively,
NAP functions with larger closure ordinals may be taken to be ‘more com-
plicated’ than NAP functions with smaller closure ordinals. Thus analysing
the closure ordinals of NAP functions would yield a classification or spectral
analysis of NAP functions (with uniform weight 1, on a fixed sample space).
Thus it might be a worthwhile project to undertake a spectral analysis of
NAP functions.
The representation theorem that was proved in the previous section (theo-
rem 29) is related to a very general representation theorem that is announced
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in [Pedersen forthc., section 6]. In this article, Pedersen extends De Finetti’s
fundamental theorem of comparative expectations to expectation orderings
that satisfy a version of the principle of weak dominance (rather than uniform
simple dominance). He then announces that such systems of comparative ex-
pectations (finite and infinite) can be represented by an expectation function
that takes values in a non-Archimedean field in which in which every number
can be written as formal well-founded power series in a single infinitesimal.
This means, of course, that the elements in such a field are lexicographically
ordered.
5 Closing
Representation theorems, like those of McGee [McGee 1994], Van Fraassen
[Van Fraassen 1976], Leitgeb [Leitgeb 2012], and the two representation the-
orems in the present article, give us reasons to think that Popper functions
capture a robust concept of probability. Popper functions cannot do anything
that NAP functions and lexicographical probability functions can’t do. So
if we believe any of these model our intuitive notion of probability well, then
Popper functions must too. Though they may not fully cash out all our in-
tuitions, for example about infinite additivity, they cannot go against them
to any greater extent than these alternatives.
Also, these representation theorems, which relate all the different models
via Popper functions, give us reasons to believe that they all correctly rep-
resent our intuitions of probability, for the same reason that the equivalence
of the different mathematical attempts at describing what an algorithm is
gives us reason to believe we have captured that notion: there are many ways
47
to be wrong about something, so it would seem unlikely that every time we
attempted it we were wrong in the same way.
So we have better reasons to believe that each of these theories for prob-
ability really do model an intuitive concept. In particular, theories in other
areas of philosophy which use Popper functions as representing probabilities
gain more support from this representation as NAP functions. NAP gives
us both a notion of how probabilities for events depend on the probabili-
ties of the individual outcomes that make up those events, and also relates
the conditional probability to the ratio of absolute probabilities in the famil-
iar, intuitive way. So Popper functions are perhaps closer to our intuitions
concerning probability than their initial axiomatic presentation may suggest.
But non-Archimedean probability functions in general, and NAP func-
tions in particular, are themselves not completely intuitive. One source of
un-intuitiveness is the non-wellfoundedness of the degrees of infinitesimal-
ity that such probability functions entail. This seems to open the prospect
that the possibility of one event can be smaller than that of another event
even though there is no largest degree of infinitesimality at which they differ.
Nonetheless, this turns out not to be the case. Our second representation the-
orem (section 4.4) shows that every NAP function value can be represented
as a well-founded power series of which each term represents the contribution
of a specific degree of infinitesimality.
In sum, our conclusion is that Popper functions, NAP functions, and
lexicographical functions cohere well, not only on finite sample spaces, but
also on infinite sample spaces.
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